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Guest Editors’ Preface
In November 2014 an international conference was held in Debrecen, Hungary which was 
organised by the University of Debrecen Law School and the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Legal Studies. The conference served as a 
fi rst step for carrying out a new research project entitled ‘How to Measure the Quality of 
Judicial Reasoning’.
The idea behind the research project is that while in the past two decades various 
‘external’ (public trust, satisfaction, affordability, accessibility, etc.) and ‘internal’ or 
‘formal’ (timeliness, fairness of judicial process, independence and accountability of courts) 
benchmarks have been worked out for the assessment of the quality of judicial activity, the 
question remains whether we can measure the quality of the actual judicial reasoning at all.
This question is important on the one hand from a purely academic point of view: if 
there are methods to measure it, then traditional depictions of judicial activity as some kind 
of art (ars boni et aequi) or the manifestation of the mystical ‘judicial wisdom’ becomes 
unconvincing. If we can measure the quality of legal argumentation then we will be able to 
evaluate decisions of the judiciary and hold its members accountable in case their reasoning 
is considered unsatisfactory, in the same way as the work of other professions is also held 
up to scrutiny. A convincing methodology to measure the quality of judicial reasoning could 
possibly shift our paradigm of how we think about law in general.
Besides the academic interest, the issue is relevant also from a very practical point of 
view: the objective measurement of the quality of work is spread not only throughout 
academia but it also seems unstoppable within the judiciary. The usual crude methods (e.g., 
number of judgments, hours of sitting, number of reversed cases on appeal) do not seem, 
however, to be able to refl ect convincingly the real quality of a judge’s work.
The researchers are interested in both the academic literature and the practice of 
judicial organisations in several European countries, i.e., among others, in questions such 
as: What is expected from judicial reasoning? Is there a general concept of good quality 
with regard to judicial reasoning? Is it spelled out in any legal documents (statutes, internal 
judicial guidelines, appellate cases)? If not, then how are these requirements enforced? Are 
there any attempts to measure the quality of judicial reasoning? If yes, then is it rather a 
peer review method, a numerical measurement, or a mixture of these?
On the fi rst day of the conference distinguished invited speakers from various European 
countries spoke about the theoretical problems of quality assessment in the fi eld of judicial 
activity (Zenon Bankowski, Arthur Dyevre) and the practical developments of judicial 
‘quality assurance’ in some major European jurisdictions (Markku Kiikeri, Francesco 
Contini, Gar Yein Ng, Norman Weiß, Zdenek Kühn). At the end of the fi rst day a roundtable 
discussion took place about the general methodological problems of measuring the quality 
of judicial activity (Philip Langbroek, Zoltán Fleck, Nicolaas Bel, Mariusz J. Golecki).
The second day was open for scholars and legal practitioners who had any contribution 
to make to this research topic from their own perspective. Case studies and theoretical 
explanations of these issues (in different contexts, such as theory of adjudication, ‘virtue 
jurisprudence’, legal sociology and political philosophy) were equally welcome.
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In the current issue of Acta Juridica Hungarica we selected to publish some papers 
presented on the second day of the conference which represent different approaches to this 
very wide research topic.
The fi rst author is Mihály Maczonkai, who distinguished between two models of 
judicial reasoning: a ‘syllogistic’ one based on deduction and a ‘heuristic’ one that uses 
prudential wisdom. He argues that the latter one is the better description of judges’ work. 
Therefore one cannot fi nd a precise professional protocol for the assessment of the quality 
of judicial reasoning.
Nonetheless, almost every other paper emphasizes the importance of well-reasoned 
judicial decisions and why the lack of proper justifi cation is a problem. Zsolt Ződi’s 
concludes that the highly formalistic way in which Hungarian judgements often cite 
previous judicial decisions does not add any value to the quality of judicial reasoning.
Eszter Kirs comes to a similar conclusion when she highlights the problems of judicial 
interpretation and reasoning in a single international court (ICTY) decision. The conclusion 
of Kirs’s case-study is that it can be a problem if judges decide serious moral and political 
issues of international law without a deep analysis of the norms of customary international 
law and the relevant precedents of case law.
One of the essential parts of legal argumentation is the interpretation of the text of the 
law. That is why the method of interpreting the law has a determinative impact on the 
quality of legal justifi cation. Ievgen Zvieriev exposes and criticises the interpretative method 
of Ukrainian courts which, as a result of the socialist heritage, insist on the textualist 
approach. This practice sometimes leads to sheer absurdity.
In relation to judicial quality, it can also be a problem if domestic courts ignore the 
relevant international legal norms. This worrying attitude is present in the jurisprudence of 
Indonesian courts – as we learnt from the case-study written by Dodik Setiawan Nur 
Heriyanto.
The sentencing practice in criminal cases is a peculiar part of the quality assessment. 
In this case the judge is not bound to the (legislated) laws and precedents in the same way 
as they are in legal interpretation. That is why it requires serious effort to fi nd the proper 
standards of reasoning when it comes to justifi cation of the delivered punishment. In his 
paper, Huang Gui throws light on the external and internal factors that can have an infl uence 
on judges when they determine the punishment of criminal offenders. Analysing the Chinese 
judicial practice, he demonstrates that without having clear norms which determine the 
proper types and measures of punishments judges are affected by many extralegal factors 
which can lead to a highly unjust sentencing practice. 
The reasoning of constitutional courts also has its special characteristics. This raises 
the question: what are the special methods for evaluating the quality of judgements made in 
politically sensitive cases. Zoltán Pozsár-Szentmiklósy, Kálmán Pócza and András Molnár 
try to shed light on the requirements of good quality constitutional adjudication. 
Pozsár-Szentmiklósy seeks to highlight numerous benefi ts of the principle of 
proportionality, which serves as a global argumentative framework in human rights 
adjudication. He argues that proportionality analysis provides an adequate scheme for 
carrying out transparent and verifi able reasoning, and it is also apt to mitigate fundamental 
legitimacy problems constitutional courts must often face due to their growing infl uence in 
political decision-making. For him, proportionality is the proper method for the courts to 
tackle constitutional issues, and by providing a formalized structure for the thought process 
it helps to assess the quality of constitutional reasoning.
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Pócza reveals how the role of constitutional courts and the legitimacy of their decisions 
can vary according to background democratic theories. He suggests that the quality of 
constitutional reasoning might increase if courts indicate at least implicitly their role 
perception in terms of normative theories of constitutional democracy since these normative 
refl ections can explain different judicial approaches and attitudes in the course of 
constitutional review.
In his paper Molnár makes some important clarifi cations concerning the appropriate 
use of the concept of judicial activism and proposes a new approach to judicial activism on 
the basis of how courts use scientifi c considerations external to law in their reasoning. At 
the end of his paper he comes to the conclusion that in terms of this new approach the US 
Supreme Court in the fi rst decades of the twentieth century can be considered as a passivist 
rather than an activist court.
To sum up, we can say that it is a worthwhile challenge to search for the criteria of 
correct judicial reasoning. The issue of the quality of justifi cation can be relatively separated 
from the problem of correctness of the decision; proper justifi cation may have a certain 
value in itself. Nonetheless, effective research requires analyzing this very complex issue 
from various perspectives.
We are grateful to all participants of the conference for the lively and deep debates, 
which gave us many insights into how to develop our research project. The guest editors are 
indebted to András Jakab, the director of the Institute for Legal Studies for his support and 
advice as well as to the Editor-in-Chief of Acta Juridica Hungarica, Professor Éva Jakab, 
who provided the opportunity to edit this special issue of the journal. We could not have 
coped with the technical issues of the editorial work without the effective assistance of 
Gergely Deli. Finally, we thank Zsófi a Zsoldics (PhD student at the University of Debrecen) 
for her help in processing the submitted papers. 
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